



Tbuq^dides’ representation of Persia is inextricably linked to his 
response to Herodotus, who placed the Persians at the centre of his 
work.‘ The younger historian was well aware that for the Greeks 
of his time, as they were embarking on the long mutual war he 
describes, the most vivid cultural memory concerned their earlier 
resistance against the Persians, from which they derived a wealth of 
still current paradigms. After Xerxes’ defeat, moreover, Persia con­
tinued to exist as a neighbouring power, which mainland Greeks may 
initially have viewed as marginal, but which ended up as the arbiter 
in their own war. This chapter examines Thucydides’ representation 
of Persia’s role in the history of the Greeks, what information about 
Persian agents, culture, and events he knows about or considers 
important, and his ‘Persian’ interactions with Herodotus.
1. THE PERSIAN WARS IN THUCYDIDES
Already in his first sentence, where he states that the Peloponnesian 
War affected both the Greeks and parts of the non-Greek world, and 
‘so to speak, most of mankind’ (1.1.2), Thucydides appears to signal 
his awareness of the role that Persia will play after 412 bce.^ On 
the other hand, here and in subsequent introductory chapters.
' On Thucydides’ knowledge of Herodotus, see esp. Hornblower (1992) and 
(1996), 19-38.
^ 1.1.1; See Gomme (1945), 91; cf. 2.65.7.
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Thucydides is looking not forwards, but backwards as he emphasizes 
the enormity of ‘his’ war in comparison to earlier ones. Persia was a 
great power (1.16) and Xerxes’ invasion represented a time of danger 
for Greece (1.18.1-2). But for the benefit of readers who in retrospect 
might be inclined to consider the Persian attacks on Greece worthy 
of the Great Historical Watershed Award of all times, Thucydides 
minimizes it in quantitative terms that are hard to counter: it was a 
short affair, after all, quickly resolved in two naval and two infantry 
battles (1.23.1).
In a groundbreaking 1999 article, Tim Rood demonstrated 
Thucydides’ awareness of the importance of the Greeks’ resistance to 
Persia for their later history, and showed the influence of that conflict 
(and of Herodotus’ account of it) on Thucydides’ shaping of his own 
narrative. Rood’s analysis served as a healthy corrective to the 
erroneous view that Thucydides has no interest in the Persian Wars 
and is contemptuous of Herodotus. We should recognize, however, 
that on this score Thucydides is sending somewhat of a double 
message. If the Persian Wars represent an important subtext in 
Thucydides’ narrative, he also signals, especially in the first five 
books, that contemporary history has moved on.
In Thucydides, references to the Persian Wars occur mostly in 
speeches as a means for gaining the diplomatic advantage in inter­
national disputes just before or during the new Greek-on-Greek 
conflict.^ Two overlapping themes predominate. One is the magnifi­
cation or devaluation of the role of different cities during the Greek 
resistance.^ The contrasting facts and interpretations put forth by 
Thucydidean speakers emerge as strands recycled from the fabric 
of Herodotus’ comprehensive narrative, but here they appear dis­
membered and recontextualized, a fact that underlines the distinc­
tion, which both Herodotus and Thucydides make in their own way, 
between investigation and rhetorical attempts to capitalize on the 
past.’ Such arguments, however, are not usually effective in con­
temporary negotiations: most Thucydidean speakers who magnify 
the Persian War and their role in it lose the debate. Several speakers
^ In the first seven books speakers mention the Persians only when speaking about 
the Persian Wars. The (implicit) reference in Archidamus’ speech at 1.82.1 (see below, 
p. 256) is an exception.
'* Athenians (1.73-75) vs. Sthenelaidas (1.86) and Corinthians (1.69); Plataeans 
(3.54, 56-9) vs. Thebans (3.62-4); Euphemos at Camarina (6.83).
^ Cf. esp. Dewald (1999).
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on both sides seem to recognize the irrelevance of the topic when 
they more or less explicitly decline to rehash that event.*’
The second theme of Thucydidean discourses is to suggest 
structural analogies between the Persian War past and current 
circumstances.^ The Corinthians depict Athens as a polis turannos 
that conquers, rather than liberates, the Greeks, and represent Athens 
as unlike her former self and equivalent to Persia (1.68, 122.2-3, 
123.3). Pro-Athenian speakers, by contrast, emphasize the continuity 
between the bold Athenians who embarked on the ships and defeated 
the Persians and their contemporary descendants, who ‘become 
islanders’ to resist the Peloponnesian invasions, or can fight on many 
fronts at the same time.®
The narrator in his own voice is more reluctant to make explicit 
comparative references.® Aside from the dismissive evaluation at 
1.23.1, we find only two more mentions of the Persian War in books 
1-7. Thucydides’ statement that the Athenians in the imminence of 
the first Peloponnesian invasion were aggrieved at having to leave 
their farms ‘which they had just restored after the Median War’ 
(2.16) reformulates Pericles’ parallel with the evacuation of Attica at 
the time of Xerxes (1.144) by focusing on the renewal and multiplica­
tion of a painful experience.The second reference compares the 
Spartan hoplites at Sphacteria, who ended up surrendering to 
the enemy, to the Spartans at Thermopylae, who died defending 
the pass (4.36.3)." This clear allusion to Herodotus, underlined by 
an apology in Herodotus’ manner for comparing ‘small things 
with great’," represents an early sign of Thucydides’ appreciation 
of the moral dimension of the war that will emerge more clearly in 
his account of the Sicilian Expedition. There the speakers’ explicit 
references to Xerxes’ invasion (6.17.7, 33.5, 83) are integrated in a 
narrative structure informed by intertextuality with Herodotus.
* Rood (1999), 145.
^ The comparison is embedded in the speeches cited in n. 4, except that of 
the Plataeans. See also Mytileneans (3.10) and Hermocrates (6.33.5). Connor (1984), 
93; and Rood (1999), 150.
* 1.143.5, 144.3-4, 6.17.7. Cf. Rood (1999), 147.
’ Cf., however, 1.98.4 and Felling (2000), 96.
“ Cf. Rood (1999), 149.
" Thucydides’ mention of ‘the path’ (4.36.3) echoes Hdt. 7.175.2 and 7.212.2. 
Hornblower (1996), 32^ and 191. Thuc. 4.40.2 contrasts with Hdt. 7.226. See Foster, 
Ch. 8 above.
Cf. Hdt. 2.10.1 and 4.99.5.
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The moralistic slant of each campaign story is the same, with hubris 
punished in both cases.*^ Finally in book 8, the evocation of the past 
is less tidy but, as we shall see below (§§VI-IX), the narrator will take 
on a greater share of the discourse and draw attention to parallels 
and reversals with respect to different moments of the Persian Wars.
II. THUCYDIDES AND THE NON-GREEK WORLD
In spite of the recent re-evaluation of the influence of Herodotus on 
Thucydides, it cannot be denied that, with a partial but notable 
exception (the Pausanias-Themistocles excursus, on which see 
below), Thucydides does not focus on Persia per se, its extent, its 
resources, its imperial structure, its people, or its king, not even in 
the parts of book 1 (the Archaeology and Pentecontaetia) that would 
have given him the occasion to do so. This stance vis-a-vis the 
Persians agrees with Thucydides’ relative lack of interest in bar­
barians in general,^'* and both are partly manifestations of what 
scholars have described (with some truth, pace Rudd) as his 
ideological rejection of Herodotus and of Herodotus’ way of doing 
history.’^
Perhaps more importantly, Thucydides’ ignore-the-barbarian 
brand of Hellenocentrism reflects the geopolitical situation of his 
time and a post-Cimonian and Periclean focus on Athenian pre­
dominance in Greece and the Aegean, which sees Thrace and the 
coasts of Anatolia as the virtual eastern and northern borders of the 
empire. In Thucydides’ synoptic view of different theatres,'® non- 
Greek peoples remain at the margins, more the object of the sideways 
glances when Greeks have dealings with them than of a curious gaze. 
Even his Sicilian insertion (6.1-6), though it represents a Herodotean 
literary manoeuvre in many respects, is no ethnography in the 
manner of Herodotus. Only rarely does Thucydides describe foreign 
customs synchronically, just as also in the historical narrative the 
nomoi and tropoi of foreigners do not usually appear among the most
” For the specific narrative parallels and differences, see esp. Rood (1999), 152-64; 
Connor (1984), 175-6, 183, 197-202; and Cornford (1907), 88-220. See also the 
different intertextual argument of Kallet (2001), 85-95.
Cf. his reductive attitude at 1,5-6. Gomme (1945), 10.
See Greenwood (2006), 7.
Ibid., 42-3.
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compelling motives or causes.'^ In his portrayal of barbarians, 
nothing compares with his exploration of the ethos and ethnic 
identity of Athenians, Spartans, Dorians, lonians, or other Greeks.’® 
A partial exception is represented in Thucydides’ treatment of 
Thrace, where he had family connections and property. The 
Thracians are the subject of an ethnographically informative passage 
(2.95-101) that includes a catalogue of tribes (2.96); measurements 
of distances (‘at the fastest four days and four nights for a merchant 
ship with the wind astern the whole way, while by land a man 
travelling light by the shortest road, can get from Abdera to the 
Danube in eleven days’, 2.97.1-2);^“ and the enumeration of the 
tribute and gifts paid to the Odrysian king and nobles in gold and 
silver, embroidered cloth and other objects (2.97.3). All this is worthy 
of Herodotus’ Scythian and Thracian logoi or his catalogue of 
the tributes of Persian satrapies (see esp. Hdt. 3.97), showing what 
Thucydides can do when he has ‘been there’. This discussion of 
tributes, however, leads to the report of a local Thracian custom that 
shows Thucydides’ ideological distance from Herodotus’ perspective:
For they established a custom opposite to that prevailing in the Persian 
kingdom, which also the other Thracians have, namely of taking rather 
than giving (it is more shameful for them not to give when asked 
than to ask and not receive), but anyway, they practised it as much as 
possible. For it was impossible to get anything done without a present. 
(2.97.4-5)
Thucydides here explains how Shakes’ empire has grown to the 
point of inviting comparison with the Persian, thanks to an elaborate 
tributary system. But with the inverted parallel he seems to pivot 
from the topic of imperial revenues to that of bribes: the Odrysians are 
takers, just as the Persians are notorious givers (especially to Greeks).^’ 
Unlike Herodotus, Thucydides is no objective ethnographer and
See Ostwald (1988); cf. Munson (2001b), 43-5.
As Connor rightly saw (1984: 36-47), the national characters of Athens and 
Sparta in particular are for Thucydides an integral part of the causality of the war, 
and Thucydides pursues the issue throughout his history. Cf e.g. 7.44, 58.
At 4.105 Thucydides says he had interests in the gold mines in the neigh­
bourhood of Amphipolis and was influential with the natives in the area, where he 
was also general in 424 bce. The name of Thucydides’ father, Olorus, is evidence of 
Thracian descent. See Hornblower (1987), 1.
For Thucydides’ expression dvi)p eii^covos, see Herodotus 1.72.3, 1.104.1, 
2.34.2. Hornblower (1991), 372.
See below, 1.109.2 (pp. 248-9); 8.83.3,45.
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rather speaks as a public executive and a business mogul (‘one can 
get nothing done without gifts’). Similarly, his generalization about 
the cowardice and ferocity of the Thracians in the account of 
the Mycalessus massacre (7.29.4) expresses in blistering terms the 
military man’s contempt for non-Greeks with whom he has dealt 
directly.
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III. PERSIANS IN THE PENTECONTAETIA
Aside from book 8, the greatest number of references to the Persians 
of the period after the Persian Wars in the voice of the narrator occurs 
in two analeptic narratives of book 1, the Pentecontaetia and the 
excursus on Pausanias and Themistocles. The first passage is an 
account of the growth of Athenian power from 479 to 434 bce. It is 
preliminary to Thucydides’ narrative of the war and does not claim 
to be detailed or complete.^^ Here the Persians are marginal: in spite 
of the fact that these events are even further from Herodotus’ topic 
than from Thucydides’, Herodotus’ scattered references provide 
more information on Persian events between the two wars.
Thucydides informs us that the pretext for the foundation of 
the Delian League was retaliation against the Persians.^^ In the 
account that follows, Athenian dealings with Persian interests occupy 
only about a third of the whole, with the balance mostly consisting of 
military or diplomatic actions involving other Greeks. As a selective 
sample of the character of the League’s activities in its early years, 
Thucydides begins by listing aggressive operations in four places: 
Eion, Scyros, Carystus, and Naxos (1.98.1-4). The last of these is 
the occasion for Thucydides’ important reflection on Athenian 
subjection of rebellious members of the League (1.99). The first, the 
only one involving the Persians directly, is brutally brief: under 
the leadership of Cimon the Athenians took Eion from the Medes 
and enslaved its inhabitants.
A proleptic narrative of the same event appears in Herodotus’ 
account of Xerxes’ march through Thrace, where two Persian gover­
nors will win the gratitude of the king for their gallant resistance at
Cf. Rood (1998), 225-48.
7Tp6axT]u<^< 1.96.1. Cf. Hornblower (1991), 144.
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the time of the Delian League operations Thucydides summarizes. 
One of these men was the governor of Eion, Boges, who refused to 
surrender under siege and immolated himself on a pyre with his 
children, wives, concubines, and all the city’s gold and silver 
(7.107.1-2). The contrast between Herodotus’ arresting description 
and Thucydides’ account shows Herodotus, unlike Thucydides, 
focusing on the non-Greek side, and seizing the opportunity (in the 
midst of his account of Xerxes’ aggression!) to illustrate and translate 
Persian notions of ayadia through the spectacular actions of specific 
Persians. Also unlike Thucydides, Herodotus displays familiarity 
with the Persian nobility and its ethical and political stance.^^ More 
generally, Herodotus takes the conflict, contrast, possible analogies or 
overlaps between the Eastern and the Western world-views as his 
overarching theme.
From a historical or ‘current events’ perspective, this portion of 
Thucydides’ work treats the Persians as old news. This markedly 
differs from the attitude of Herodotus, who is sensitive to the 
multi-levelled significance of the past he celebrates for the present of 
narration and of the continuity between earlier and later events.^® 
Moreover, Herodotus places the Persian and inter-Greek wars along a 
continuum of imperialistic evils,^^ while Thucydides’ Pentecontaetia 
as a whole arguably emphasizes the break between the two wars.
Already at the time of the capture of Sestos the Spartans have 
withdrawn from the common effort (1.89.2); soon they will abandon 
it for good (1.94-5). At Athens, although the alliance with Sparta is 
still intact (1.92), the hero of Salamis is intent on outwitting the 
Spartans, (1.90-3), and no longer the Persian king.^^ It is Thucydides’ 
opinion (ms i/jiot So/cet) that Themistocles drew his lesson on the 
importance of defence by sea from the Persian War (see 1.93.7), but 
his antagonism with the Peloponnesians was new. The narrator 
appears to agree with this position.^* Soon after Themistocles dis­
appeared from the political scene, in fact, the definitive dissolution
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For Herodotus’ access to Persian sources, see Munson (2009). On Thucydides’ 
lack of familiarity with the Persians, cf. Westlake (1985), 43.
Cf esp. Fornara (1971), 57-84.
“ Cf 6.98; Stadter (1992); Munson (2001a), 201-5.
Cf Hdt. 8.75 and 8.110.2. See below, p. 254 and n. 60 for Thucydides’ reference 
to variant versions of those Herodotean episodes.
See Thucydides’ praise of Themistocles’ foresight at 1.138.3 and his emphasis on 
the impermanence of the Spartan-Athenian alliance at 1.18.3.
of the alliance between Sparta and Athens (1.102-3) confirmed that 
a new era had begun.
The Athenians, of course, continue to pursue a vigorous anti- 
Persian policy, but the focus of Thucydides’ narrative is elsewhere. 
Cimon’s double victory at the Eurymedon receives only a brief 
mention (1.100). The Athenians’ massive and disastrous six-year 
campaign to Egypt in support of the rebel Inaros (1.104 and 109-10) 
seems to anticipate some of the themes of the Sicilian Expedition.^’ 
But Thucydides’ choice not to develop this section makes what must 
have been a huge blow for Athens and a triumph for Persia appear 
rather inconsequential in the longer term.^° It also minimizes the 
themes of bad counsel and overreaching that are so prominent in 
the Sicilian narrative, substituting an emphasis on the Athenians’ 
resilience and activism in the pursuit of empire, which is the major 
theme of the Pentecontaetia.^‘ A few years later, in fact, Thucydides 
places the Athenians in Cyprus with two hundred new ships and 
again in Egypt (1.112.1-3).’^ How these anti-Persian operations 
wind down remains unclear: of an end of the war with Persia he says 
not a word.”
On Persian operations related to the Egyptian war, Thucydides 
appears well informed. He reports the (presumably secret) royal 
mission of a certain Megabazus, who tried to bribe the Spartans into
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See esp. 1.110.1: ‘Only a few of many managed to escape to Gyrene marching 
through Libya, but most died’ (oAi'yoi dno ttoXXojv Tropeudp-evm Sid Trjs is
Kvp^vrjv iawdtjaav, oi Si TrAeiCTTOi dncoXovTo); 1.110.4: ‘[the Phoenicians] 
destroyed most of the ships, and only a small number managed to escape’ {Sii<j>d€i,- 
pav rds TToXXds twv v€Wv, at S’ iXdooovs Siitjivyov ndXLv)^ ‘this was the outcome 
of the great expedition of the Athenians and their allies to Egypt’ (rd p,iv Kara Trjv 
pLeydXrjv arpaTeiav Mdrji'aioji' Kat r<jjv ^vpt.p.dywv is Atyvirrov ovtcos ireX^VTi)- 
atv). Cf 7.87.6: ‘few out of many returned home; and these were the events in 
Sicily’ (oAiyot d-no ttoXXuiv in oikov dnevoar-paav. ravra p,iv rd ntpl UiKeXiav 
yevopLeva).
“ Cf. Hornblower (1991), 173-8, who also explains what losing the control of 
Egypt would have meant for Persia. For a fuller account of the Athenian expedition to 
Egypt (c.460-454), see Diodorus 11.71-5.
Thucydides seems to have considered (or reconsidered) the Sicilian expedition 
in similar terms. The end of book 7 almost suggests the obliteration of all Athenian 
hopes, but at 2.65.12 Thucydides coolly observes that the disaster did not prevent 
Athens from pursuing the larger war for eight more years; likewise, the beginning of 
book 8 emphasizes Athenian resilience.
For this campaign, see also Plut. dm. 18.5-9, and cf. Diod. 12.3-4, with Briant 
(2002), 579.
” On the Peace of Callias and its aftermath, see esp. Diod. 12.4.4-5. Andrewes 
(1961), 15-18; Kagan (1969), 107-13; Rood (1998), 229.
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invading Attica, and he mentions the general of the Persian army in 
Egypt, Megabyzus son of Zopyrus (1.109.2-3).^^ In Herodotus, 
Zopyrus recaptures Babylon during the reign of Darius; Herodotus 
also mentions his son Megabyzus (confirming the role Thucydides 
attributes to him in Egypt) as well as Megabyzus’ son Zopyrus 
(Hdt. 3.160.2). This younger Zopyrus may well have been one of 
Herodotus’ sources for matters of Persian history drawn from his 
remarkable family tradition.” But since according to Herodotus he 
defected to the Athenians, he may also have talked to Thucydides 
about more recent events, including the strenuous Persian attempt 
to regain control of Egypt under his father’s command.” If so, 
Thucydides has not fully exploited that opportunity. He says nothing 
about the initial revolt of Egypt from Persia, except that it was the 
occasion for the Delian League’s intervention in support of Inaros. 
Herodotus, by contrast, brings up this revolt three more times in 
addition to the passage just cited (3.160.1). After saying that at the 
site where Cambyses defeated Psammenitos in 525 he saw proof that 
Persian skulls are soft and Egyptian skulls very hard, Herodotus adds 
that he was able to verify this phenomenon ‘among the bodies of 
the dead at Papremis, where Achaemenes, the son of Darius, was 
defeated by Inaros of Libya’ (3.12.4).
Later in the Histories, Herodotus specifies that this Achaemenes 
had become governor of Egypt after his brother Xerxes suppressed 
a previous revolt and instituted a harsher regime, and that 
Achaemenes subsequently died at the hands of the Libyan Inaros, 
son of Psammenitos (7.7).^^ In spite of Inaros’ wrongdoings, says 
Herodotus in a third passage (3.15.3-4), his son Thamyris eventually 
obtained from the king the governorship of Egypt. From this and 
other cases Herodotus infers that ‘the Persians are accustomed 
(icodaoi) to honour the children of kings; even if they rebel from 
them, nevertheless they at least give power back to their children’
Besides the Megabazus and Megabyzus in this passage, and the kings, Persian 
individuals mentioned by Thucydides are Pissouthnes, Artabazus (son of Pharnaces I), 
Pharnaces II (grandson of Pharnaces I and son of Pharnabazus I), Pharnabazus II 
(son of Pharnaces II), Megabates, Artaphernes, Tissaphernes, Tamus, Arsaces, and 
Cyrus the Younger. Cf Lewis (1977).
” See Wells (1907); Munson (2009), 464.
* See Ghimadayev (1983), cited by Hornblower (1991), 164.
” Cf. Thuc. 1.104.1 (‘Psammetichus’). For fuUer accounts of the Egyptian revolt 
and Athenian expedition there, see Ctesias F 14.36-8 Lenfant, and Diodorus 11.71 
and 74.
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(3.15.2). Herodotus is in the business of observing all sorts of dif­
ferences among nations. Here his ethnographic impulse produces 
insights about the interface between culture and policy in the area of 
Persian relations with subject peoples. Throughout his work he holds 
up Persian affairs for display as implicit terms of comparison for the 
imperial challenges, especially revolts, of the type that Thucydides 
describes in his history of the Athenian Empire.
Thucydides, for his part, pays attention to the Persians only insofar 
as they potentially affect Greek interests. On the coast of Asia in 
particular it was not uncommon for factions in the cities of 
the Athenian League to seek help from the neighbouring satraps.^* 
Thucydides omits most of these incidents, but the last Persian 
passage in his Pentecontaetia records that at the time of the secession 
of Samos, the Persian governor of Sardis, Pissouthnes son of 
Hystaspes, supported the rebels. On that occasion the Athenians were 
worried about the imminent arrival of the Phoenician fleet, which 
however never materialized (1.115-16). More spectacular, though 
equally inconclusive, had been earlier intrigues of Pausanias and 
Themistocles with the Persians. The section where Thucydides tells 
this story presents special features and deserves to be examined 
separately.
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IV. PAUSANIAS, THEMISTOCLES, AND THE PERSIANS
The Pausanias-Themistocles section is composed of two analeptic 
passages inserted contiguously at the end of book 1 (1.128-34 and 
1.135-8). At this point in the chronological development of the 
main narrative, the outbreak of the new Greek-on-Greek conflict is 
imminent. The Spartans have issued an ultimatum demanding that 
the Athenians drive out the almost two-centuries-old Alcmaeonid 
curse. The Athenians have responded by bidding the Spartans to 
clean up some curses of their own (1.128.1-2). Since the Spartans 
incurred one of these when they caused the death of Pausanias, 
Thucydides takes the opportunity to tell the latter’s post-Persian War
e.g. probably in Erythrae (see ML 40), Sigeum (ATL III 55), Miletus (ATLII 57 
60) and Caria (ATL III 114-17 and 308). For the last, see Kagan (1969), 179, also 98- 
102; Briant (2002), 580.
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story (1.127-34), to which he attaches the post-Persian War story of 
Themistocles at the point where the two stories appear to intersect 
(1.135-8). This internal transition further distances the sequence 
from its initial factual connection to the main narrative.
The insertion is an unexpected throwback to the past in more ways 
than one. Its optional character and the manner in which it spins off 
are in themselves typical of Herodotus. With both Athenians and 
Spartans accusing each other of religious offences committed long 
ago, Herodotus might have said that his logos required him to explain 
the circumstances of those earlier events (see e.g. Hdt. 1.95.1). By 
Thucydides’ usual standards, however, these grievances are not 
genuine enough and therefore not causally important enough for 
the outbreak of the war to merit explanation. Just as they are mere 
diplomatic pretexts in the world of the narrated (1.126.1), so they 
also constitute a blatant pretext for the analepses from the point 
of view of Thucydides’ discourse. Thucydides has already treated 
Themistocles and Pausanias (in this order) in the Pentecontaetia.^^ 
His choice to add more at this point or, to put it another way, to sever 
this material from its proper chronological context, provides a clue 
that the excursus has a paradigmatic and thematic role. The excursus 
represents a reflection on general issues that will be important in the 
rest of the work, such as the nature of leadership in connection to 
the Spartan and the Athenian character. It therefore prepares the 
reader for the entrance of Pericles, Thucydides’ protagonist and the 
ultimate leader in the war that is about to begin.^°
These insights explain the anomalous position of the section, but 
not so much its oddity in form and contents. The Pausanias- 
Themistocles excursus appears to replace what we have called 
Thucydides’ overall rejection of Herodotus (see above, p. 244) with 
an imitation of Herodotus, adopting this author’s favorite structure, 
diction, historical method, and focus. It includes aspects of what we 
would expect Thucydides to regard as legendary (a partial sense of to
” 1.89.3-95.7; see above, §III. For the ‘Herodotean’ flavour of Thucydides’ 
narrative about Themistocles and the walls at 1.89.3-93.7, see Blosel, above,
pp. 216-18.
“ Most concise on this point is Finley (1942), 139. On ‘Pausanias-Themistocles’ 
from a literary viewpoint, see also esp. Cornford (1907), 135-7; Konishi (1970); 
Westlake (1977); Connor (1984), 48-9; Carawan (1989); Hornblower (1987), 26 
and (1991), 211-12; Patterson (1993); Rood (1998), 138 and 180. There is also a 
substantial bibliography on the difficulties of this passage from the point of view of 
the historical Pausanias or Themistocles or both; see e.g. Lang (1967).
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fxvdd)Ses at 1.22.4): a biographical interest of Eastern stamp,the 
introduction of probably fictional letters,attention to personal 
motives, and the appearance of a female character in an active 
role.^^ Here we also find the subdivision of the narrative through 
summarizing introductions and conclusions,^^ a leisurely narrative 
pace and simple style,^^ the Herodotean use of certain words,^* 
metanarrative references to research, hearsay, or tradition,^^ the 
presence of poetic or exotic-sounding expressions,^® celebration 
through superlatives,"*® and the description of enduring memorials.®” 
Many of these features individually occur elsewhere in Thucydides. 
But the sheer accumulation of them in a single narrative at the end 
of book 1, when we have already grown accustomed to a certain 
Thucydidean style, is designed to throw the reader off balance.
The way in which the excursus deals with Persia is also 
Herodotean and contradicts what we have noticed so far about 
Thucydides’ criteria of selection. In the first place, it highlights 
Persian customs and institutions in an uncharacteristic way. The 
term aarpaiTeLa, which Herodotus defines as a province of the
"" Cf. Momigliano (1993), 34-8.
Pausanias to Xerxes (1.128.7), Xerxes to Pausanias (1.129.3), and Themistocles 
to Xerxes (137.4), the first two introduced with the prospective rdSe (instead of 
TotavTa) in the Herodotean manner. Cf. in Herodotus the letters of Harpagus to 
Cyrus (1.124), Amasis to Polycrates (3.40). Cf Westlake (1977), 102-3. For a detailed 
re-examination of the Themistocles excursus, see now Blosel, Ch. 9 above, pp. 223-36.
Admetus’s wife at 1.136.3; cf in Hdt. Mitradates’s wife (1.111), etc. For Gomme 
(1945), 438 the supplication episode resonates of tragedy, while for Carawan (1989), 
154 the scene recalls Odysseus’ supplication of Arete (Od. 7.133-81). Herodotean 
storytelling frequently combines epic and dramatic elements.
■‘‘‘ For prospective introductions, see e.g. iyevero Si ToidvSe at 1.128.3, and see 
further 128.4,128.6,129.3. For retrospective conclusions, see 1.129.1 {roaavTa fj,iv rj 
ypatf>rj iSrjXov) as well as the solemn close of the entire double narrative at 1.138.6.
‘Here the lion smiled’, says the scholiast with relief 
** e.g. STTapriarai as synonym for AaKeSatpioviot at 1.128.3, 131.1, 132.1 (as 
frequently in Hdt.). The expression rdr TSXX-qviKov TToXefjLOv apparently to mean ‘the 
war of the Greeks (against Persia)’ at 1.128.3 is not found in 5th-cent. authors; see 
also ivSvop^evos (1.130.1). Cf Westlake (1977), 97-102.
" See below, p. 255.
Sopl iX(l)v, ‘having captured them by the spear’ (1.128.7); ae vv^ p.rj6’ 
rjjxipa i-rrtax^TU) ojare dvflvai npdaaeiv ti (Lv ip.ol imiaxvrj, ‘let neither night nor 
day keep you from doing what you promise me’ (1.129.3).
1.138.3: ^e^awTara . . . Kpariaros .. . dptaros', 1.138.6: Aa/UTTpordrou? 
ytvop,ivovs r&v Kad’avrovs 'EXX^pvaiv.
1.134.4 (the burial of Pausanias and subsequent Spartan dedications); 132.2-3 
(Pausanias’ inscribed tripod at Delphi); 138.5-6 (monument to Themistocles in the 
agora of Magnesia and secret burial in Attica).
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Persian Empire, appears only here in Thucydides (1.129.1).®‘ Persian 
evepyeala—in the sense of‘benefactions’ to the king—is a feature of 
Achaemenid internal policy emphasized by Herodotus.^^ The expres­
sion dv'pp TTioTos (1.128.7) to denote the king’s faithful, also appears 
in Herodotus in an Achaemenid context, as does dvpp dyados, as we 
have already seen.” Direct communications between Greek indi­
viduals and the king are frequent in Herodotus, but occur only here 
in Thucydides. The narrative trope of noting that ‘the king rejoiced’ 
after reading Pausanias’ letter {3ep^r]s 8e tjoOt] ■ ■ ■ rfj iTnaToXfj, 
1.129.1) recalls several passages in Herodous where an eastern 
monarch is pleased (or not) with his adviser.” It is paralleled by the 
king’s reaction to the letter of Themistocles (1.138.1, ^aaiXevs ■ ■. 
idavp,aae), whom Thucydides himself praises as d^ios Oavp-doai 
at 1.138.3.^^ Artaxerxes rewards Themistocles with the gift of three 
cities in Asia (1.138.5); to Pausanias Xerxes offers unlimited 
resources in gold, silver, and military forces (1.129.3). Thucydides 
has a lot to say elsewhere on the subject of Persians and money 
(especially in book 8), but the insistence on visible symbols of 
Eastern wealth (gold and silver, et sim.)-, only paralleled by 
Thucydides’ description of the Odrysian Empire, is another 
Herodotean trait.”
1.129.1. Hdt. translates aaTpaneia at 1.192.2 and 3.89.1. The term aarpaTnjs 
does not occur until Xenophon; Herodotus and Thucydides use imapxwv (rather 
loosely) or dpx'v*' for the Persian governor of a province. Cf. Munson (2005), 56.
“ See 1.128.4, eiiepyeaiav ... is /SaaiAea; 1.129.3, Ktiatrai ooi eiiepyeaia iv tw 
r/puripw oiKcp is dvaypavros, where dvaypa-mos refers to the special list on 
which the king’s benefactors were inscribed (cf. euepyerijs jSaoiAeos dviypa(firj in 
Herodotus 8.85.3); 1.137.4, puoi eiiepyeaia o^eiAerai. Herodotus gives the Persian 
term orosangai for the tvepyirai, or benefactors of the king of Persia (8.85.3), and 
throughout his work mentions several individuals who earned this position. Cf. 
Munson (2005), 57. The term evepyirris is of course also used for expectation of 
Greek-on-Greek reciprocity, an important theme in Herodotus as well as in this 
Thucydidean passage: see 1.136.1, where Themistocles is called evepyir-qs of the 
Corcyraeans (1.136.1).
Cf. also Xerxes’ injunction to Pausanias Trpdaaeiv ws dptara Kat maroTaTa 
(1.129.2). TTioTOTaTOs is also used of Argilius at 1.132.5. For ttlotos in Herodotus in 
a Medo-Persian context, see e.g. 1.108.3, 113.3, 3.74.1; dvrjp dyados occurs, for 
example, in the description of Boges, the governor of Eion at 7.107.1 cited above, 
p. 247.
*■* Cf. Gomme (1945), 432. See e.g. 8.69.2 (Xerxes vs. Artemisia).
“ Herodotus typically expresses ‘wonder’ and attributes it to his characters; see 
e.g. 7.204 and 208.3.
For the Odrysian Empire at 2.97, see above, pp. 245-6. Cf. also 2.13 for 
Athenian gold.
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Writing like Herodotus, Thucydides completes and corrects two 
biographies his predecessor had purposely left unfinished.^^ He 
vividly fleshes out Herodotus’ references to Pausanias’ hubris and his 
desire to be the ruler of Greece.^* He manipulates the pattern of 
the individual Greek who tries to find favour with the king of Persia, 
so that Pausanias acquires certain stereotypical features of the 
Herodotean Themistocles.” Themistocles’ letter to Artaxerxes in 
Thucydides reproduces and internally confirms that Themistocles 
had sent messages to Xerxes, as reported by Herodotus. Thucydides’ 
account of Themistocles’ flight to Persia shows the fulfilment of 
Herodotus’ proleptic reference to the same outcome.® Pausanias’ 
offer to marry Xerxes’ daughter (1.128.7) smacks of a tall tale 
competing with the more restrained tradition in Herodotus that 
Pausanias, ‘if the story is true’, became engaged to the daughter of 
Megabates, a cousin of Darius who was general in west Asia before 
the Ionian Revolt.*' The issue of cultural differences, fundamental in 
Herodotus, but normally ignored by Thucydides, is also conspicuous 
in this passage. Thucydides’ Pausanias, like the Herodotean Scyles 
(4.78), transgresses his national space and norms in diet, dress, and
” Patterson (1993), 146 is largely on target here, and see also Hornblower (1991), 
211. Herodotus’ treatment of Pausanias and Themistocles, however, is itself ironical, 
in the sense that it counts on his audience’s awareness of the unfortunate end of both 
leaders. See Fornara (1971), 62-74.
Thuc. 1.128. 3 e(f>i.€ix€vos rrjs EAAr/vi/rijj apxrjs ‘aiming at the rule of Greece’ 
corresponds to Hdt. 5.32 epcora ax<jjy TrjS EAAdSoj Tvpavvos yeveadai; cf. 
Thucydides’ statement at 1.95.3 that his position seemed to the Greeks an imitation 
or tyranny more than a generalship. At 1.130.2 Thucydides expands Herodotus’ 
reference to the ii^pis of Pausanias (Hdt. 8.3.2) with a description of his violent ways. 
He becomes ‘difficult to approach’ (Sva-iTpoaoSov . . . dfroiaiy djOTc p,TjS€va 
Svvaadai TTpoaUvai, 130.2), recalling both the royal inaccessibility of Deioces 
(Hdt. 1.96) and the tyrannical rages of Cambyses (Hdt. 3.27-36) and Cleomenes 
(Hdt. 6.75.1).
See the intermediary Gongylus at 1.128.6 corresponding to Sicynnus in 
Herodotus 8.75 and 8.110.2. The vavKX-qpos in Thucydides 1.137.2-3 fulfils a similar 
function. For the pattern of the Greek exile in Persia, cf. Boedeker (1987), 191-3.
“ See Thuc. 1.137.4, referring to the messages reported by Herodotus 8.75 (before 
Salamis) and 8.109 (after Salamis, with the proleptic reference to Themistocles ’ flight 
to Persia at 110.5).
Hdt. 5.32.1. This is probably the Megabates of Thuc. 1.129.1, governor of 
Dascyleion until Xerxes replaced him with Artabazus son of Pharnaces in response 
to Pausanias’ appeal. The name of Pharnaces appears as Parnaka of the Persepolis 
fortification tablets. Another of his sons, Pharnabazus, is the father of Pharnaces II, 
the destinatary of the Spartan embassy at Thuc. 2.67 and the father of the famous 
Pharnabazus of book 8. Cf. Lewis (1977), 7-11,52; Hornblower (1991), 215.
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demeanour (1.130.1).*^ As a fugitive from his land, Themistocles 
adopts foreign ways, although he remains productive and sane: ‘he 
learned as much as he could of the Persian language and of the 
customs of the country’ (1.138.1).
In the Pausanias-Themistocles excursus, metanarrative references 
justify the origin of some of the information (d»? varepov aviqvpddr], 
1.128.6), or caution the reader that certain parts of the story are the 
product of hearsay (cu? Aeyerat, 1.132.5 and 138.1; Xeyerai, 1.134.1; 
(f>aai, 1.138.6); on one occasion, the narrator proposes an alternate 
version (Aeyouai 5e rivej, 1.138.4). All this conforms to Herodotus’ 
practice of Aeyetv rd Aeyd/xeva, and not to Thucydides’ model of 
processing his research in advance and out of view.
Because the whole Pausanias-Themistocles section is pervaded by 
‘an aura of Ionian laropir]’, to use the words of one scholar, many 
think that Thucydides composed it early in his career.^^ What is more 
important and certain, at any rate, is that it was rather late in his 
career that Thucydides chose to include it at this point of his work. 
Regardless of its origins, the piece functions in its present context as 
a ventriloquist display of a type of historiography Thucydides 
had rejected by the time he settled on his own special method and 
project.*^ It is tempting to regard it as Thucydides’ farewell to 
Herodotus, and to the topics, method, and style Herodotus stood for. 
At a close range, that is, the alienation from Greece of the two most 
distinguished Persian War heroes (see Xaprrpordrovs at 1.138.6) 
signals the irrelevance of that past: in Pausanias, Thucydides sees the 
corruption of the old Panhellenic ideal and in Themistocles the albeit 
premature foresight to move away from it. Thucydides’ praise of 
Themistocles (1.138.3)—somewhat closer to his usual style—forms a 
‘natural bridge’ to the entrance of Pericles, who in the ‘now’ of the 
main narrative inherits Themistocles’ role.*"^
® The language of nomos is prominent here: ev tw KadearuiTi rpoirw (1.130.1), 
i^eSiBifirrjTo tcjv KadiOTWTwv vop.ip.coi' (1.132.2), (p^pco/revoi ro) rpoTTw wTiep 
€lcL>daaiv is afds avrovs) (1.132.5).
“ Westlake (1977), 96, arguing for the existence of a written source (Charon of 
Lampsacus); see also Carawan (1989) (Stesimbrotus of Thasos). These theories are 
speculative, but they remind us that Herodotus need not have been the only model.
^ I suggest as a parallel the beginning of the Histories (1.1-5), where Herodotus 
makes a few important points even while he gives a demonstration of what he does 
not intend to do in his work.
® Hornblower (1991), 223, who especially notices the parallelism between 
KpariOTOS avToaxeSid[,eiv rd Siovra, of Themistocles at 1.138.3 and ovBevos 
ijaacov . . . yvcbrai t€ rd Siovra Kai ipfxevevaai, ravra of Pericles at 2.60.5.
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For the long range, however, the past will be far from irrelevant. In 
fact, the paradigm of Pausanias and Themistocles was perhaps 
prophetic, and destined to reappear again, together with Persia, in 
the figures of the Athenian Alcibiades and Tissaphernes at the end of 
the work as we have it, and in the figures of the Spartan Lysander and 
Cyrus in the projected ending Thucydides never wrote. But in that 
later part of the History, from what we are able to see, Thucydides’ 
recognition of Herodotus takes a very different form.
V. PERSIA IN THE ARCHIDAMIAN WAR
The machinations of Pausanias and Themistocles, Megabazus’ 
embassy to Sparta (1.109.2), and Pissuthnes’ support of the revolt 
of Samos (1.115-16) already suggest the circumstances of future 
Persian interference in Greece. Greek leaders might have their own 
reasons to cut deals with Persian officials. The latter have abundant 
resources and might be willing to spend them to promote their inter­
ests as they chafe at the Athenians’ presence on the Asiatic coast. This 
pattern will come to the foreground in Thucydides’ book 8. Here we 
will look at earlier phases of this involvement.
Starting from very beginning of the war, according to Thucydides, 
both Peloponnesians and Athenians planned diplomatic missions 
to elicit the king’s assistance (2.7.1). The Spartans in particular 
formulate their policy early on, when Archidamus defensively asserts 
that, faced with the danger of Athens, the Spartans are justified in 
attempting ‘to acquire allies both Greeks and barbarians’ (1.82.1).** 
In the second year of the war, we learn of a Peloponnesian embassy 
dispatched to Persia in order to ask for funds.*^ While on their way 
to Asia the envoys visit the Thracian king Shakes, where, however, 
they are betrayed to some Athenian ambassadors present at Shakes’ 
court. The Spartans are brought to Athens and summarily put to 
death (2.67.2-4). Thucydides’ narrative emphasizes this Athenian 
violation of international convention, which shows the fragility of
“ Meaning Persians as well as Thracians (see 2.67).
On Spartan contacts with Persia, cf. Lewis (1977), 61-4, and Brunt (1965), 
262-4.
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human and divine laws under the pressure of war.®® But a secondary 
theme is the pathetic fate of the Peloponnesian envoys, who, in 
contrast to their heroic ancestors celebrated by Herodotus, neither 
reach their destination nor return home.®®
A missed opportunity to exploit Persian interests in Asia occurs 
three years later, when the Spartans sail across the Aegean with the 
intent of aiding the Mytilenean revolt. They are late for that mission, 
but at Erythrae some lonians and Lesbians urge them to capture a 
base and foment a revolt of Ionia, suggesting that Pissouthnes (the 
governor of Sardis who had supported the Samian rebels) might be 
persuaded to lend his support. But the plan seems too dangerous to 
the Spartan admiral Alcidas, who decides instead to return home 
(3.31).
The third and last Archidamian War episode of Persian involve­
ment belongs to the seventh year (winter of 425/4), when an 
Athenian commander in Thrace intercepts Artaphernes, a Persian 
envoy on his way to Sparta.^” In Athens they translate the message 
he is carrying: the king, it said, did not understand what the 
Lacedaemonians wanted; many ambassadors had come, but they all 
said something different; if they wished to speak clearly, they should 
send him other envoys with this Persian (4.50.2). What the Spartans 
wanted, of course, was Persian money, and they must have been 
aware that the king expected territorial promises in exchange. But 
they have been calling themselves the ‘liberators of Hellas’ and 
cannot unambiguously offer to barter with Persia the freedom of 
the Asiatic Greek states, hence the enduring communication gap.^^ 
The irony is palpable, because traditionally it is the Spartans who 
are likely to exhibit befuddlement at the diplomatic contortions of 
foreign envoys that come to them.^^ Here the Persian king com­
plains—in Assyrian—that the plain-speaking Spartans have not been 
expressing themselves all that plainly to him.
This passage wraps up Thucydides’ view of the role of Persia in 
the Archidamian War and explains the meaning of his selective
“ This episode, which must have shocked contemporaries, also appears in Hdt. 
7.137.2-3; see Munson (2001a), 191-3.
® On the 480 bce mission to Persia of Sperthias and Boulis, the fathers of the two 
Spartan envoys of 430, see Hdt. 7.133-7.
™ Possibly an Achaemenid, perhaps a relation of the two Artaphernes, father and 
son, in Hdt. 5.25.1, 6.42.2, 7.74.2. Cf. Lewis (1977), 2.
” 2.8.4. Cf. Gomme (1956), 499.
” See Hdt. 3.46; cf. 1.152 and Thuc. 1.86.1.
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treatment of Persia’s negotiation with the Greeks. A scene in Aristo­
phanes’ Acharnians suggests that the Athenians had had dealings of 
their own with Persia and that by these negotiations—ineffective 
enough to become comic material—Athens, like Sparta, hoped to 
obtain financial support.^^ Thucydides records no specific cases of 
Athenian embassies, except for the Athenian envoys in charge of 
escorting Artaphernes back to Asia at 4.50.2. These men intend 
to seek an audience with the king, presumably to counter Spartan 
diplomacy, but return home after learning of Artaxerxes’ death 
(spring 424).^^ There is some evidence that the Athenians sent 
another mission in the following year.^^ Thus, while probably under­
reporting Athenian contacts with Persia in the Archidamian War, 
Thucydides chooses to single out for attention three incidents 
involving the Spartans, all ending in failure and pointing to Spartan 
inadequacy abroad. The Spartans have no coherent international 
policy likely to motivate the king, they lack the drive to campaign 
overseas, and they are utterly unable to persuade, communicate, 
negotiate—or even competently move—on the borders of the Greek 
world. Persia, as a result, remains on the sidelines of the action until a 
weakened Athens and a Sparta that lets go of her scruples will turn 
her into a major player in the Greek war.
VI. ENTER PERSIA
The Artaphernes narrative at 4.50 marks the point at which 
Thucydides almost entirely stops looking in the direction of Persia as 
he reports the last years of the Archidamian War and the Peace of 
Nicias. With his description of the Sicilian Expedition, he is making a 
different movie, one more than ever informed by the memory of the 
Persian Wars but oblivious of contemporary Persia.’^^ The Persian 
gap lasts from 4.50 to 8.5.4 and covers a span of ten years, aside from
” The Acharnians (425 bce) was produced about one year before Artaphernes of 
Thuc. 4.50 was brought to Athens. Cf Knights 478, where the Paphlagonian/Cleon 
accuses his enemies of intrigues with Persia. Cf Gomme (1956), 499.
For problems of the chronology, see Lewis (1977), 69-76, and Hornblower 
(1996), 207-8.
See Andocides 3.29 and ML 70. Cf Andrewes (1961), 2—4; Kagan (1974), 306; 
Lewis (1977), 76-7.
See above, pp. 243-4.
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a brief report at 5.1 that the Delians, whom the Athenians, citing 
religious concerns, had expelled from Delos, were allowed to settle in 
Atramyttion by Pharnaces, the governor of Dascyleion.’'^ This notice 
serves as a ‘seed’ for a later episode that illustrates one of the themes 
in book 8, the victimization by both Persians and Greeks of the 
Greeks living on the Asiatic coast.^*
In book 8, after her defeat in Sicily, Athens engineers her own 
recovery and mounts a new force, while in the Eastern Aegean two 
new parties become ready to take advantage of her weakness with 
Peloponnesian help: while the lonians see the opportunity to acquire 
freedom from Athens, the Persians are eager to resubject the lonians 
to their rule. These complementary goals bring together the two 
Persian strands that emerged separately in the earlier part of 
Thucydides’ work, namely the representation of the real Persia ‘now’ 
and the memory of the Persian War past, beginning from the Ionian 
Revolt of 499.
Thucydides stages the appearance of Persia in his narrative for 
maximum impact. In contrast with previous (unsuccessful) Spartan 
missions to Persia (see above, §V), he now reports consecutively two 
different Persian initiatives to contact the Greeks. First, Chians and 
Erythraeans arrive in Sparta, taking with them an ambassador from 
Tissaphernes who invites the Peloponnesians to Asia and promises 
financial support (rpo^ryv, 8.5.4-5). At about the same time, 
Pharnabazus, the son of Pharnaces, Tissaphernes’ colleague to the 
north, sends to Sparta certain Greek exiles living at his court, with 
the request to bring Peloponnesian ships to the Hellespont. Both 
satraps hope to obtain a Spartan alliance for the king, in order to 
induce the cities in their respective provinces to revolt from the 
Athenians, and thereby regain their tribute (8.6.1).
While Pharnabazus is from a lineage of satraps of Dascyleion 
familiar to Thucydides’ readers,^^ Tissaphernes, introduced with 
no patronymic, comes out of the blue.®” The appearance of the 
Persian factor in book 8 is indeed all the more sudden because of
” On the gap, see Andrewes (1961).
™ The fate of the Delians of Atramyttion is reported 8.108.4; see below p. 274.
” Above, n. 61.
He appears here for the first time with no patronymic or introduction. Cf. 
Westlake (1985), 43. For the possibility that Tissaphernes draws his lineage from one 
of Herodotus’ Hydarnes, see Lewis (1977), 83-4; Hornblower (2008), 765.
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Thuq^dides’ choice not to update us on relevant Persian develop­
ments that have taken place since the death of Artaxerxes (which 
he mentioned at 4.50.2), including the revolt of Pissouthnes, the 
anti-Athenian satrap of Thucydides’ earlier accounts.®^ Pissouthnes 
was defeated and replaced by Tissaphernes, who in fact appears now 
at 8.5.4 as Darius’ ‘general of the districts on the coast’ {aTpaT-qyds 
... ru)v KaTCd)}^ Thucydides has also given us no advance notice of 
a probably connected situation, the still ongoing rebellion in Caria of 
the son of Pissouthnes, Amorges, whom we find fighting on the 
Athenian side later on.®^ We first hear of the revolt of Amorges in the 
narrative of the Chian embassy to Sparta, and only indirectly, 
through Thucydides’ report of Tissaphernes’ thought. This is not a 
trivial event, because in addition to his eagerness to recover the 
tribute from the Greek cities in his province Tissaphernes’ desire to 
capture or kill Amorges is apparently one of the causes for his desire 
to join the Peloponnesian side in the war (8.5.5).
The paraphrase of the address of Tissaphernes’ ambassador to the 
Spartan assembly iivqyeTo ... v-mayy^lTo) and of his intentions 
(evdjLu^e), which in turn includes references to the king as a constant 
but distant point of reference {vtto ^acriAeoi? . .. jSaaiAef. .. cocrTrep 
avrw TTpoaeVa^e ^aaiXevs), recalls the calculations Herodotus 
attributes to Aristagoras on the eve of the Ionian Revolt (Hdt. 
5.35.1). Persian focalization has been rare since Thucydides’ report 
of Megabazus’ mission, the royal letters in the Pausanias- 
Themistocles piece, and the letter confiscated from Artaphernes.®^ 
The paraphrase is novel because of Thucydides’ representation of a 
Persian agent whose strategy and motives will become the object of 
scrutiny in an unprecedented way.
But the ‘Persia’ that plays such an important role in Thucydides’ 
narrative of the Greek War from this point on is not the grand 
empire Herodotus describes, the multicultural home of distant
*' See 1.115 and 3.32.1. On the revolt of Pissouthnes, see Ctesias (F 15.53 Lenfant).
For a discussion about whether Tissaphernes was the territorial satrap of Sardis 
or held a special western command, see Flornblower (2008), 767-8. Cf. Hyland 
(2007), 3 and n. 9.
8.5.5; at 8.19.2 both Athenian and Amorges’ forces threaten the Peloponnesians 
at the same time, but only from 8.28.2 and 8.54.3 do we learn that the Athenians 
are backing him. Cf. Andocides 3.29. The chronology is uncertain; see Andrewes 
(1961), 4-6; Rood (1998), 153-4; Hornblower (2008), 765 and 769-70, with recent 
bibliography.
Cf. 1.109.2; 4.50.2.
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capitals, possessing a global policy masterminded by the king. It is 
rather the peripheral space of its most western provinces, where the 
king is present only as a removed authority (or potential constraint) 
in documents and diplomatic discourse.®^ Similarly, in an earlier 
passage that testifies to Thucydides’ awareness of Persia’s role in 
Athens’ ultimate defeat, he speaks neither of Persia, nor of the king as 
its central executive, but in a more limited way of ‘the king’s son 
Cyrus, who provided funds to the Peloponnesian fleet’ (2.65.12).
The two satraps of book 8, Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, have no 
special cultural trait or perspective. They rather resemble the many 
scheming Greek individuals with sectarian interests and limited 
control who proliferate in this part of the narrative. Money—hard 
cash—becomes a crucial issue. Thucydides does not mention Persian 
dinners or piles of silver and gold, like Herodotus, or like Thucydides 
himself in the Pausanias-Themistocles episode and in his description 
of Odrysian wealth.®® The colourful utterance that Alcibiades will 
attribute to Tissaphernes—that he will not leave the Athenians with­
out pay, ‘not even if he had to turn his own bed into silver coin’ 
(8.81.3)—is a deliberately phoney piece of verbal perserie by a most 
unreliable speaker.®^ For the narrator Thucydides, the Persian satraps 
are simply pragmatic executives, careful with their investments (the 
rpo(f>r] they are ready to pay to the Peloponnesian fleet) and eager to 
recuperate the revenues (^dpot) from the cities in their provinces.
VII. WHAT THE SPARTANS WANT
The narrative that follows the account of the embassies at 8.5-6 
raises the problem of the position of the Spartans, who have begun 
the war as liberators of Greece from Athens (2.8.4), but now become 
the instruments of the resubjection of Ionia to Persia. The Spartans 
accept the invitation of the Chians and Tissaphernes (8.6.2),
“ See 8.17.4, 8.28.3, 8.37.2 and 4; 8.43.3, 8.46.1, 8.52, 8.56.4, 8.58.2, 8.84.5, 8.87.5. 
In Thucydides, the only direct contacts between Greeks and the Persian king occur in 
the Pausanias-Themistocles excursus of book 1: see above, p. 253.
“ For Persian symbolic wealth in the Pausanias-Themistocles excursus, see 1.129.3 
and above, p. 253; Odrysian wealth: 2.97.3 and p. 245.
I am borrowing the term perserie from Miller (1997). Alcibiades is talking to 
Athenians who have their own preconceived ideas of how a Persian satrap would talk.
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although the prospect of cooperation with Pharnabazus in the 
Hellespont remains on the table and will be revived periodically.** 
The evocation of Herodotus’ Ionian Revolt—by means of implicit 
analogies and inversions, and with different individuals sharing this 
or that role—becomes compelling when the Peloponnesians, led by 
Chalcideus and Alcibiades (who is the new Aristagoras at this point), 
bring about the revolt of Miletus while the Athenian fleet takes its 
station at Lade (8.17.3). Lade is the site of the notorious Ionian 
defeat in 499,*® and to make sure we do not miss the coincidence, 
Thucydides follows it up with an abrupt prospective announcement 
of the ‘first alliance’ between the Spartans and the Persian king 
(8.17.4).
The way in which Thucydides marks this treaty recalls the 
sentence with which, after the battle of Lade and the destruction of 
Miletus, Herodotus underlines the third subjection of Ionia (Hdt. 
6.32). This third subjection follows a first and a second subjection by 
Lydians and Persians, respectively, and just as Herodotus implicitly 
looks forward to a fourth enslavement of Ionia (the one by Athens, 
after the Persian Wars), so Thucydides anticipates the second and 
third treaties between Sparta and Persia (8.36 and 8.57.2), all of 
which bring about the equivalent of a fifth enslavement, by delivering 
the lonians once again into Persian hands.®” These agreements 
confirm the history of Ionian vulnerability, which begins with 
Herodotus’ account of the Mermnad aggressions (Hdt.l.14-26) and 
culminates at the end of Herodotus’ work with the debate between 
the Spartans and Athenians about what to do with the lonians after 
the Persian Wars, at which time the Spartans propose to move them 
to Greece or else let them fend for themselves (Hdt. 9.106.2-4). In 
Thucydides, that history continues with the lonians’ subjection by 
Athens and with the ambiguous policy of the Spartans in the 
Archidamian War, by which the ‘liberators of Hellas’ send embassies
“ S.6.2-5, 8.8.2,8.39.1,8.61.1 and 62.1, 8.80.1, 8.99.1.
For echoes of the Ionian Revolt see Kallet (2001), 95-7 and Hornblower (2008), 
800-1.
The term ‘enslavement’ borrows from Herodotus’ language at 6.32, and is 
echoed by Thucydides in the indirect speech of Lichas at 8.43.3 (see below, p. 263). 
See Hornblower (2008), 801. For Herodotus on the conquests of Ionia, see Munson 
(2007), 146-9. Thucydides also echoes Herodotus’ narrative of the defeat at Lade in 
his sombre reflection on the reversal of fortune of Chios (8.24), which corresponds to 
Herodotus’ lament on Chian sufferings after Lade (Hdt. 6.26-7); see also below, 
p. 274.
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to the Persian king, who therefore (of course) is confused about what 
they could possibly want (above, §V). Now, during the Ionian phase 
of the war, the Spartans appear ready to acknowledge in writing that 
they want to win the war, whatever the cost.
The material support Tissaphernes has promised to the Spartans 
will consist of payment for the Peloponnesian crews (8.5.5), although 
the first treaty says nothing on this topic (8.18). The two allies 
cooperate in the war and the Peloponnesians capture lasus and 
Amorges (8.28.3), thus fulfilling one of Tissaphernes’ major goals 
(8.5.5) and a clause of the treaty.^’ But the Peloponnesians are 
unhappy with the amount of rpocf>r] Tissaphernes agrees to pay, and 
this leads to a second treaty,^^ which specifies that ‘the king shall pay 
the expenses {tt]v Sandvrjv) for whatever army is in the territory 
of the king, if the king has sent for it’ (8.37.4). In the midst of the 
controversy about pay, no voice in the history has yet drawn 
attention to the amazing clause in the first two treaties, negotiated 
by commanders in the field, recognizing Persian claims to ‘all the 
territory and cities that belong to the king or once belonged to his 
ancestors’.’^ Only officials who come from Sparta to oversee the 
conduct of the war raise objections. In a meeting with Tissaphernes 
at Cnidos their leader, Lichas, complains that
it is terrible if the king claims to hold power even now over all the 
territories that he and his ancestors ruled in the past: for that entails 
that all the islands would be back in a state of slavery as well as Thessaly, 
Locris, and as far as Boeotia, and that instead of giving the Greeks 
freedom the Lacedaemonians would be imposing on them Median rule. 
(8.43.3)
Refusing the that comes on these terms, Lichas rejects both
of the previous treaties and demands a new one. Tissaphernes storms 
out in a rage and negotiations break off. The Spartans sail for
See 8.18.3; cf. 8.28.3. On the whole Thucydides suggests that the capture of 
Amorges was a coup for Tissaphernes and that even from the spoils of lasus the 
Peloponnesians did not benefit as much as they could have; cf. Kallet (2001), 252, 
following Lewis (1977), 91.
” 8.29.1, Thucydides implicitly links the dissatisfaction of some of the 
Peloponnesian allies at this payment plan (8.29.2) with the revision of their treaty 
with Persia (8.36.1-2).
” The two formulae at 8.18.1 and 8.37.2. For other differences in the two treaties’ 
formulation of what rights the king claims over these possessions, see Hornblower 
(2008), 800-2 and 854-7.
Rhodes, determined to renounce Persian help and collect other funds 
(8.43.4-44.4).
After waiting so long to have the Spartans introduce the 
ideological issue of Greek freedom (but after implicitly sounding 
the alert since the time of the first treaty: see above on 8.17.4), 
Thucydides’ narrative conveys the impossibility that the Spartans can 
take a principled position and obtain a Persian alliance at the same 
time. Lichas’ protest in fact conflates two overlapping points, one 
concerning the extent of the country the Spartans give up to the king, 
and the other about allowing him to enslave again {naXiv SovXeveiv) 
any Greeks at all. When the Spartans and Tissaphernes patch up their 
quarrel, they stipulate yet a different treaty, which limits the king’s 
possession to territories in Asia. Lichas’ second complaint is thus 
overruled by the same clause that addresses the first:
All the territory of the king in Asia is the king’s: and about his own
territory let the king decide as he wishes. (8.58.2)
These terms agree with the position of the Persians in Herodotus, 
who repeatedly assert that Asia and its inhabitants belong to them.’^ 
Thucydides represents the Spartans as conflicted and in denial, but 
also makes clear what their policy must be as the allies of Persia. 
At one point the same Lichas who had reaffirmed the liberation 
principle at Cnidos reminds the Milesians and others in the country 
of the king that at least until the end of the war they are bound to 
accept a ‘moderate degree of enslavement’ (xpyjvou ■ ■ ■ BovXeveiv ... 
rd jueVpta, 8.84.5).
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VIII. WHAT TISSAPHERNES WANTS
Tissaphernes’ indignant reaction to Lichas (dyavaKTwv, 8.43.4) is 
the obverse of Xerxes’ rejoicing after reading Pausanias’ letter 
(Sep^Tjs 8e rjad-q, 1.129.1). From this point in the narrative until 
Tissaphernes’ fears (8e8uhs ■. • i4>o^€lro, 8.57.1) induce him to 
backtrack and stipulate his third treaty with the Peloponnesians,
See 1.4.4: tt]v yap Aalrjv Kal ra ivoiKeovra edvea ^dp^apa oixrjiovvTat ot 
Uepaai,, r-qv Si EvpwTTTjv xa'i to 'EXXrjViKov rjyyjvrai Keycoplodai (‘the Persians 
consider Asia and the foreign people who inhabit it as their own, and they think that 
Europe and the Greek world is separate’). Cf. 9.116.3.
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Thuq^dides devotes himself to an exploration of the motives of the 
Persian satrap and of the choices by which he tries to achieve his 
goal of re-establishing Persian dominion over the Ionian Greeks. We 
learn at 8.45 that by the time he had walked out of the Spartan 
meeting (8.43.4), he had already received the visit of Alcibiades, now 
a fugitive from Sparta and intent on promoting his own interests. 
Alcibiades becomes Tissaphernes’ ‘instructor in everything’, the 
designer of his policy and apparently also his agent.®^ He advises 
Tissaphernes not to be too much in a hurry to end the war by helping 
the Peloponnesians, but rather to let the Greeks wear each other 
out {avTOvs TTcpl iavTOvs rovs'EXXrjvas KaTarpiijjaL, 8.46.2). The 
Athenians, he says, would make better ‘partners of empire’, since 
unlike the Spartans they have no commitment to the freedom of the 
Greeks. Tissaphernes should therefore wear out both sides {rpi^eiv 
. .. dp,(f)OTepovs, 8.46.4) and after acquiring as much Athenian 
territory as possible, expel the Peloponnesians (8.46.1—4).
Like Pausanias and Themistocles in Thucydides and numerous 
characters in Herodotus, Alcibiades is the typical Greek at an Eastern 
court making trouble for his fellow Greeks.’*’ It is interesting there­
fore to find that in treating a Herodotean theme in this passage, 
Thucydides also borrows again from the style of Ionian laroptr], 
or at least one aspect of it: the reliance on opinion. His purposes 
here are the historiographic purposes of separating Tissaphernes 
from Alcibiades, deliberation from advocacy, and what is visible and 
documented from what is not. The work of the historian appears 
especially arduous in book 8, which is full of characters who lie. 
Alcibiades is one of them, hovering over the figure of Tissaphernes, 
who risks being confused with him. Thucydides reports Alcibiades’ 
advice and actions at great length, but in his attempt to determine 
the ‘real’ motivations of a Persian grandee in an unfamiliar setting, 
he appears to find himself with no reliable source and signals his 
insecurity by resorting to the Herodotean method of explicit con­
jecture (8.46.5): Tissaphernes, says Thucydides, ‘reasoned for the 
most part in the same way as Alcibiades (StevoeiTo to ttXcov ovtcos)> 
at least if one were to guess from what he did (oaa ye dv6 tcov
8.45.1; for the analepsis, see Hornblower (2008), 883-86; Rood (1998), 262-65. 
His mixed role as adviser and executive is represented by the combination at 8.45.4-6 
of verbs indicating what he said or did vis-i-vis others and verbs indicating what he 
said to Tissaphernes.
’’’ See above, p. 254 and n. 59.
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TTOioviiivcov fjv etKoocu).*^ Tissaphernes heeds Alcibiades’ advice 
first of all by paying the Peloponnesian sailors badly and irregularly. 
He had followed this practice on his own in the past (8.29), but his 
purpose this time—suggested by his didaskalos Alcibiades—is ‘to 
ruin their mission, causing their ships to lose their fitness’. Also in 
other respects, Thucydides adds, one could not possibly miss the lack 
of energy he put into the common war (rd re dAAa Karacfsaveo- 
repov p ware Xavddveiv ov TTpodvp,co?, 8.47.5). The end of this 
sentence underlines again the historian’s endeavour to distinguish 
between the seen (KaTac/saveaTepov) and the unseen (Xavddvetv), an 
endeavour that pervades the Persian sections of book 8.
Thucydides indicates Tissaphernes’ independence from his Greek 
adviser by mentioning nothing in this chapter about his reaction 
to Alcibiades’ suggestion to find an accommodation with the 
Athenians. Things change somewhat only after the quarrel with the 
Peloponnesians at Cnidos (8.52; cf. 8.43), when Tissaphernes realizes 
ipadero) the Spartans’ conflicted attitude with regard to the treaty. 
Lichas’ complaint in fact verifies Alcibiades’ argument that the 
Spartans were unlikely to set out to liberate the Greeks from Athens 
only to enslave them to the Persians. It also perhaps implicitly 
gives some credit to the other side of Alcibiades’ argument, namely 
that the Athenians, accustomed as they are to holding the Greeks 
under their rule, would be more willing ‘to share their enslavement 
{^vyKaTaSovXovv), keeping the sea for themselves and leaving 
to Tissaphernes the Greeks who inhabit the king’s country’.^* 
After Cnidos, therefore, although Tissaphernes is afraid of the Pelo­
ponnesians’ presence in Asia (SeStdra with the indicative, vaprjaav, 
indicates that the fear is not unjustified), he starts considering 
Alcibiades’ plan, but without great conviction: ‘he ... wanted to be 
persuaded if he possibly could’ (jSouAdjU-evov Se ... et Svvairo ttoi?, 
TTeLadfjvai). This is the closest Tissaphernes comes to agreeing 
with the idea of an Athenian alliance. Alcibiades’ elaborate argu­
mentations are designed to manipulate his internal audiences—
8.46.5. The verb eiVd^co in the sense of ‘guess’ or ‘infer’ (in contrast to oiSa, 
‘know’: see 6.92.5 and 8.87.2-3) appears again to signal Thucydides’ uncertainty 
about Persian intentions at 8.87.3. See below, p. 270. Of three other occurrences of 
the verb in metanarrative, two are found in the Archaeology for guesses about the 
distant past (1.9.4 and 1.10.2) and the third, at 6.60.2, in reference to the mystery 
of the mutilations of the Herms. For eiKa^cD in the sense of compare at 4.36.3, see 
above, p. 243.
Cf. 8.52, with a back reference to Alcibiades’ words at 8.46.3.
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Tissaphernes, the Athenians, and the Spartans (8.83.2, 87.1; cf. 
80.1)—as well as his external ones—Thucydides’ readers and per­
haps Thucydides himself. But Thucydides’ narrative makes clear 
that from Tissaphernes’ perspective a deal between Persia and Athens 
remains unlikely.”
Both Tissaphernes’ treaties with the Peloponnesians and 
Alcibiades’ negotiations with the Athenians in Tissaphernes’ name 
bargain away the freedom of the Greeks of Asia and cause internal 
dissent. In Athens the mere prospect of Persian support has dis­
proportionate consequences, persuading the demos to give up its 
rights (8.53, 65-9). The Athenians continue to hope against all hope 
(8.76) and Alcibiades encourages them by reporting the satrap’s 
alleged assurances in exaggerated orientalizing terms (8.81.3, and see 
above, p. 261).
Alcibiades’ discourse, however, has very little to do with what 
Tissaphernes really wants.The supposed royal conditio sine qua 
non for a Persian alliance, namely a change of government in Athens 
(8.48.1), is not something Tissaphernes seems to know or care about. 
When the oligarchs arrive at Sardis to confer on this deal, Alcibiades 
invents extravagant demands designed to abort the negotiations 
because he is himself uncertain about Tissaphernes’ position. 
The latter ‘feared ((jso^ovfxevov) the Peloponnesians more than the 
Athenians and, moreover, wanted to wear out both sides (rpi^eiv 
dfM(f>oT€povs), as Alcibiades had instructed him to do’ (8.56.2), while 
Alcibiades wanted to appear (So/cetv) to the Athenians able to 
persuade Tissaphernes even if he was not able to do so (56.3). In the 
midst of this obfuscation, Thucydides once again cannot be sure, but 
offers his opinion: ‘It seems to me (So/cet 8e p.oi) that Tissaphernes 
also wanted this result out of fear {8id to 84os, 8.56.3). He feared 
(SeSidj?, €^o^€iTo) that without his support the Peloponnesians 
would be defeated by the Athenians, or that they would defeat the 
Athenians on their own, or that they would ravage his country in 
search of sustenance’ (8.57.1).
Phrynicus had earlier described Tissaphernes’ predicament in 
similar terms (8.48.2). Thucydides himself elsewhere theorizes 
that fear is in general a compelling and perfectly rational motive for
” So also Hyland (2007), 8.
The verb /SoilAo/^ai occurs four times in 8.56.2-3 and another five times in 
book 8 in reference to Tissaphernes’ hidden intentions.
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historical action (1.23.6; cf. 1.76.2). In Thucydides’ judgement there­
fore, Tissaphernes’ decision to reconcile with the Peloponnesians and 
stipulate a third treaty was made ‘with calculation and foresight of all 
these factors, according to his intention to equalize the Greek forces 
on each side’ (ttcivtcov ovv tovtojv XoyiafjiM Kat npovoia, (Lairep 
i^ovXero iTvavioovv tovs 'EXXipvas Trpos dXXrjXovs, 8.57.1). 
Xoyiap,6s denotes the careful reasoning that allows for prudent 
action, advocated by leaders such as Archidamus and Hermocrates 
(2.11.7 and 6.34.4, 6); npovoia, ‘foresight’, is the primary virtue of a 
skilful statesman, which Thucydides attributes to Themistocles and 
Pericles.Thucydides’ evaluation of Tissaphernes’ policy—based on 
his opinion of the most rational motives for the satrap’s uneven 
behaviour—is somewhat circular, but it represents a remarkable 
exercise in fairness.*®^
IX. THE PHANTOM FLEET
An index of the historian’s difficulties in negotiating Persian 
appearances and reality is the Phoenician fleet, of whose existence we 
learn for the first time from the advice of Alcibiades to Tissaphernes 
to diminish the Peloponnesians’ pay and not to bring out the 
Phoenician fleet he was preparing’ (8.46.1). Tissaphernes follows 
both suggestions, all the time promising to the Peloponnesians ‘that 
the Phoenician fleet will arrive’ (8.46.5). The third mention of this 
fleet occurs again in reported ‘speech’, this time an official written 
document. A clause of the Peloponnesians’ third treaty with Persia 
stipulates that Tissaphernes will maintain the Peloponnesian fleet 
‘until the ships of the king arrive’; after that the Peloponnesians are 
to provide for their own support and the two fleets will carry on the
See 1.138.3 (npoewpa) of Themistocles and 2.65.6 and 5 of Pericles {Trpovoia, 
Trpoyvovs)-
Westlake (1985), 54 seems surprised that Thucydides, influenced by Alcibiades, 
‘mistook the oriental wiliness of Tissaphernes of which he can have had little experi­
ence, for the statesmanlike qualities which he so much admired’ (emphasis mine). It 
is true that Thucydides cannot have had direct experience with Tissaphernes, 
but he makes an honest attempt to evaluate him according to the same standards 
he applies to Greek politicians, being especially careful to distance himself from the 
representations of Alcibiades. For the principle that one’s opponents will deliberate 
on the basis of calculations not radically different from one’s own, see the words of 
Archidamus at 1.84.3-4.
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war jointly (8.58.5-7).The clause shows that the Phoenician ships 
we have only heard about so far, through Alcibiades (8.46.2) and 
Tissaphernes (8.47.5), are part of the Persian forces under direct 
command of the king, although they are evidently available to 
Tissaphernes for his operations in western Asia. Their role as 
specified in the clause is ambiguous, because they will apparently not 
(or not only) serve to support the Peloponnesians, but might even 
replace them, taking over the war. The consequences are potentially 
disquieting, but remain theoretical because in Thucydides’ narrative 
as we have it the Persian ships will never become part of the action. 
For the moment they are a pretence:
Tissaphernes prepared to bring the Phoenician ships, as it had been
agreed, and to fulfil all the other things which he had promised and
which at least (yow) he wanted to appear to be preparing. (8.59.1)
The metanarrative intervention yovv underlines Thucydides’ 
reformulation of the distinction between appearance and reality: 
here the historical agent ‘wanted to appear’ (e/SouAero . .. 8rjXos 
efmt), while at 8.47.5 his behaviour was ‘too apparent’ to hide his 
true intentions (/cara^aveoTepov wore XavOdveiv).
According to the usual pattern of book 8, the mirage of Persian 
support not only aggravates the conflict between Peloponnesians 
and Athenians, but also causes stasis within each camp. The Pelo­
ponnesian crews are in full protest mode against both Tissaphernes 
and their own admiral, Astyochus, on the ground that both are ‘ruin­
ing their mission’ by not permitting them to engage the Athenians, 
leaving them without pay, and making them wait for the Phoenician 
fleet, ‘which in any case was a fleet in name and not in fact’ {dXXcos 
ovofxa Kal ovk epyov, 8.78).*“ The language of this piece, focalized 
through the Peloponnesian crews, is close to that of Thucydides’ 
account of Tissaphernes’ policy (see 8.46.5), except that the Pelo­
ponnesians also falsely suspect that Tissaphernes is favouring the 
Athenians (8.83.2). Alcibiades, as a matter of fact, is assuring the 
Athenians that Tissaphernes will bring the Phoenician ships, which
For this treaty, see above, p. 264.
In the Pentecontaetia the Phoenician fleet plays a decisive role against the 
Athenians in Egypt (1.110.4), but fails to materialize at the time of the revolt of 
Samos (1.116.3).
The sailors suspect Astyochus of taking bribes from Tissaphernes (8.83.3; cf. 
8.45). For internal stasis among the Peloponnesians, see 8.78, 80, 83-5.
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are already at Aspendus, to them, rather than to the Peloponnesians 
(8.81.3)—or at least, if not to them, not to the Peloponnesians either 
(8.88.1). Once again, the reader first learns a crucial fact about these 
ships—that they are deployed in Aspendus—from a reported speech.
The next passage is unique in Thucydides for the way in which the 
narrative nucleus (essentially: ‘Tissaphernes went to Aspendus with 
Lichas, leaving his lieutenant behind, but he did not bring back the 
ships that were there’) is embedded in metanarrative that reveals 
speculations, hearsay, and opinion:*^
In the same summer, Tissaphernes at precisely the time when the Pelo­
ponnesians were most angry at him for many reasons, but especially on 
account of the return of Alcibiades, thinking that evidently {(f>avepd>s) 
he was now on the side of the Athenians, since he wished, as indeed it 
seemed (^ouAd/xcvo?, d>s iSoKei 8ij), to clear himself of these charges, 
prepared to travel to the Phoenician ships at Aspendus and invited 
Lichas to go with him (8.87.1). He said that he would leave his lieu­
tenant Tamos with the army to give them their pay while he was gone. 
Accounts differ and it is not easy to know {Xeyerai Se ov Kara ravro 
ovSe paSiov eihevai) with what intention (rtVi yvcjpLTj) he went to 
Aspendus and, after going, he did not bring back the ships (8.87.2). For 
it is certain (aa4>es eart) that the Phoenician ships, one hundred and 
forty-seven in number, arrived as far as Aspendus, but why they did not 
come is the object of many inferences (TroXXaxfj eiKa^eTai). Some say 
that he went in order to wear down (SiaTpi/Siy) the Peloponnesian 
mission just as he had planned {(Larrep Kal ?nevorjd-q)—in fact Tamos, 
who had been put in charge, was not, to be sure (yovv), a better pay­
master, but rather a worse one; others [say] that he had brought in the 
Phoenicians in order to exact money from them for their discharge, 
since he did not intend {ovSev e/aeAAe) to use them anyway; others 
again [say] that he went on account of the accusation against him at 
Sparta, so that it would be said that he was not doing anything wrong'“^ 
and that he had certainly gone (aa<f>a)s oiyerai) and the ships were 
reaUy (dX-qOws) ready (8.87.3). It seems to me most certain, however 
(e/xoi pLevTOi So/cef aa(j>iaTarov etvai), that he did not bring back the 
ships with the aim of wearing down and delaying (rpijS-i)? eVe/ca Kal 
dvoKwxvs) the Greeks, on the one hand by wasting [their resources] 
{(f>dopds p.ev) while he remained lingering over there, and on the other 
hand by equalizing [their forces[ (dviad)oea>s 8e0 in order not to make
For a narratological and historical analysis of this passage, see Lateiner (1976). 
dis ovK dSiK€i (87.3) answering the Peloponnesian complaints that ‘they were 
being wronged in every way’ (ndvra re dSiKoivTO 99.1).
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either side strongest by his support. For, if he had wanted to, he could 
have finished the war with no ambiguous results really coming out in 
the open in an unambiguous way {eTu^avels Stjttov ovk evSoiaarws). 
For tf he had brought his fleet out he would in all likelihood [Kara to 
eiKos) have given the victory to the Spartans, who even at the present 
moment were facing the Athenians with a fleet that was more equal 
than inferior (8.87.4). What convicts him most of all is the ostensible 
reason (7Tp6<f>aaiv) he gave for not bringing the ships: he said that they 
were fewer in number than the king had ordered him to collect. But in 
this case he would rather have received more gratitude, if he had not 
spent many of the king’s resources while achieving the same results 
(8.87.5). But whatever his intention {fjTiviSrj yvcofMrj), Tissaphernes 
arrived at Aspendus and joined up with the Phoenicians. (8.87.6)
This fleet that never enters the scene of the action, and in this 
sense never becomes a tangible reality—a fleet that is only a name 
{ovofxa Kal ovk epyov, 8.78) from the point of view of the 
beleaguered Greeks—embodies the imperfectly known resources of 
Persia as well as the power and strategy of the distant king, 
whose orders are again represented (or misrepresented) indirectly 
through Tissaphernes’ speech (8.87.5). Thucydides himself is at a 
loss, and enumerates only the few positive facts he can count on as 
certain {aacfs-). There were certainly (8.87.3: aa(f)es, dXrjdcos) 147 
Phoenician ships at Aspendus—the precise number suggests the 
reliability of the information. It is also certain that Tissaphernes went 
to Aspendus (8.87.1; 2; 3, aacfxios otyerai; 6), but (and this is a 
negative fact, contradicting expectations) he failed to bring back the 
ships. What is less easy to know for sure (8.87.2 ov8e paSi.ov eldevai) 
is Tissaphernes’ motive for going to Aspendus, and his overall plan 
with regard to the Greek war (8.87.1, /3ouAdp,evo?; 87.2, tIvi yvwpirj-, 
8.87.3, Sievo-i^Or], efxeXXe; 87.6, TjTivtSi) yvcofxr]). Tissaphernes’ 
behaviour creates, or means to create, certain appearances (87.1, 
(jsavepoos tjBt] arToci^ovTi; 87.2; 87.3, yovv), and is explained by him 
with a pretext (87.5, TTpocfsaoiv). His real intentions are at any rate 
a matter for various speculations (87.3, TroXXaxfj etA:d^eTat),‘“® 
opinions (87.1, cu? e’Sd/cet St)), and reports (87.2, Xeyerai 8i ov 
Kara ravTo; 87.3, ol puev ... ol 8e ... aXXoi S’). All of them are 
plausible, but the greatest possible certainty resides in the opinion of
The verb eiK-a^erai is the same Thucydides had used to infer Tissaphernes’ 
motivations from his actions at 8.46.5: oaa ye dwo twv TTOwvp,4vu>v pv eiKdoai. See 
above, pp. 265-6 and n. 97.
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the histor Thucydides (87.4, e/tiot ^livroi SoKei aa<f>4ararov e?vai) 
to the effect that Tissaphernes wanted to wear down both sides in 
the Greek War, and not simply ruin the Peloponnesian cause, 
according to Alcibiades’ original advice and in agreement with 
Thucydides’ assessment of Tissaphernes’ policy earlier on.““
This passage represents Thucydides’ most dramatic divergence 
from the method he had announced in what Hornblower calls 
the ‘haughty’ chapter 1.22.‘" It is Herodotean, although in a very 
different way than the Pausanias—Themistocles performance of oral 
tradition and exotic detail."^ It is a cautious piece of analytical 
reasoning that combines features of Thucydides’ style“’ with the 
method, more typical of Herodotus, of presenting several inter­
pretations of an event, including one preferred by the narrator."'* 
Thucydides here embraces Herodotus’ narratorial stance and 
makes it his own without irony or mock-competition—in fact with 
apparent resignation to his coming across as somewhat pedestrian 
and redundant in a way his predecessor never does.
Thucydides’ efforts to be an objective observer become par­
ticularly strenuous throughout book 8, where special interests and 
fragmented actions multiply. The praise of the extreme oligarch 
Antiphon (8.68), the indictment of the exaggerations of the 
democrat Chaereas (8.74), the exposure of Alcibiades’ lies, coupled 
with the recognition of his service (8.86.4), the positive judgement 
on the government of the 5,000 (8.97.2), all these interventions are 
part of the same balancing act and effort not to be seduced by one
Rosario Vignolo Munson
As Lateiner observes (1976), 271, this observation now differentiates 
Thucydides’ opinion from the first report, at 8.87.3. So also Hyland (2007), 11.
See 8.56.2 (^ouAo/nevou . .. TpijSeiv d/xi^oTepous), where Tissaphernes is 
heeding the advice Alcibiades expressed at 8.46.2 (auroi)? trepi eavToiis rods 
"EWirjvas Kararpitpat) and 8.46.4 (rpijSea' . . . ap,<j>oripovs). Alcibiades, according 
to Thucydides, is among the characters of the history the best informed about what 
Tissaphernes plans to do, at least in the short range, ‘knowing in all likelihood 
Tissaphernes’ intentions, that he was not going to bring the ships’ (eiScos, (hs ci/rdj, 
eK TiXeovos rrjv Tiaaa(f>epvovs yv<hp.-qv, on ovk e/xcAAe, 8.88.1).
*" Hornblower (2008), 1005.
On Pausanias-Themistocles, see above, §IV.
So the antithesis with variatio in the sequence rpL^yjs ev€Ka Kat avoKco')(rjs ... 
<f>dopds p,iv ... dviawoeco'; 5e at 8.87.4 is typically Thucydidean; cf. for example 
1.84.4.
Cf Herodotus 6.75.3 and 6.84 (speculation about causes) and 1.86.2 (specula­
tion about motives). For other variant versions in Herodotus, cf Lateiner (1976), 
267-9.
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view or the other, as is also the narrator’s evaluation of Tissaphernes’ 
rationality in pursuit of his interests (8.57.1; see above, p. 268). 
Thucydides can report and judge homegrown phenomena with his 
accustomed authority, just as he can deliver a stunning reconstruc­
tion of the stasis in Athens or vividly describe the atmosphere of the 
Athenian fleet at Samos. He is able to give his Greek characters 
extended speeches, albeit in indirect discourse. But in the case of an 
unknown power whose actions are visible only on the margins 
and whose policies are filtered through individuals with personal 
agendas, the result is a blurry portrayal. Thucydides’ objective stance 
requires a display of subjectivity (‘some say . .. others say . .. but 
from what one can infer . ..’) amounting to an admission that he 
does not really know.
This partial return to Herodotus’ historiographic method also 
happens to coincide with flashing evocations of specific Herodotean 
passages and scenes. At 8.87.3, the hypothetical gloss ‘if he had 
wanted to ... he could have finished the war with no ambiguous 
results ... if he had brought his fleet out he would in all likelihood 
have given the victory to the Spartans’ corresponds to Herodotus’ 
more passionate extended opinion {yvaj^-q, Hdt. 7.139.1) con­
cerning the Athenians’ decisive choice to fight at Salamis: ‘If the 
Athenians had not resisted Xerxes on the sea . .. Hellas would have 
been conquered’ (7.139.2-4)."^
It does not bode well for the future that now it is not a Greek city 
that can determine the success of a war against the Persian king, but 
a Persian satrap who has the power to decide the outcome of a war 
between Greeks. When Thucydides records the headquartering of the 
Athenians at Sestos, ‘the town in the Ghersonese held by the Medes 
at an earlier period in this history as the centre for the defence of 
the Hellespont’ (Thuc. 8.62.3), he brings us back to his own and 
to Herodotus’ account of the end of the Persian War (Thuc. 1.89.1; 
Hdt. 9.115-16). The four Athenian ships overtaken by the Pelo­
ponnesians off Elaeus, one of which is captured opposite the 
temple of Protesilaus (8.102.4), reshuffle the terms of Herodotus’ 
Hellespontine chapters, where Protesilaus and his temple establish a
There are other hypothetical glosses of interpretation in Thucydides; see 
e.g. 8.96.4. But 8.87.3 is exceptional for its length and because it is combined with the 
other metanarrative features we have seen.
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connection with the remote past."*^ At the end of Thucydides’ work, 
the Greeks living in Asia appear again unprotected from the abuses 
of all sides. Already the Chians have suffered in an unprecedented 
way ‘since the Persian Wars’, this time at the hands of the 
Athenians.”^ Tissaphernes’ lieutenant Arsaces oppresses the 
Antandrians, who chase his garrison from the city (8.108.4). This 
man, says Thucydides with an analeptic move in the Herodotean 
manner, had treacherously massacred the Delians who had settled at 
Atramyttion after the Athenians had expelled them from Delos.“* 
The episode recalls and inverts the harsh treatment of the Persian 




Thucydides’ treatment of the Persians is uneven and difficult to 
summarize in a schematic or global way. We can safely say that he 
never shows particular interest in, or familiarity with, their culture 
or the political organization and history of the Persian Empire per se; 
by the same token, he does not play up Persian stereotypes, either, 
and (‘Pausanias-Themistocles’ aside) he avoids emphasizing the 
alterity of the East. He makes us aware of the formative importance 
of the Persian Wars for the ideology of the Greeks as they embark on 
their internal conflict, although for most of his history he tends to 
dismiss Persia as a secondary concern. Separately from the rhetorical 
exploitation of the Persian War by his historical agents, Thucydides 
does not fully convey his own appreciation for the moral dimension 
of that event until his narrative of the Sicilian Expedition. After that, 
the reappearance on the Greek horizon of the Persian threat (or 
lifeline, depending on one’s viewpoint) brings back images of the 
contest between Greece and Persia, and particularly of the dis­
couraging struggle for the ‘liberation’ of the Asiatic Greeks. Here
Hdt. 9.116. For Protesilaus in Herodotus, see Boedeker (1988). That Thucy­
dides’ mention of the temple of Protesilaus at 8.102.4 represents an allusion to 
Herodotus is accepted by Hornblower (2008), 1047 following Pelling (2000), 269. 
8.24.3, with reference to Hdt. 6.26-7; cf. above, p. 262 and note 90.
Thucydides records the expulsion of the Delians at 5.1 See above, pp. 258-9. 
Hornblower (2008), 1052.
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Thucydides is also faced with the task of representing a close-up of 
contemporary Persians, because Persia is now a protagonist, not 
merely an object of memory or a sideline player. Does the end 
of his history amount to an acknowledgement of inadequacy on 
Thucydides’ part?
I have deliberately avoided the various issues concerning the 
unfinished state of book 8, but I am reminded that many years ago 
Donald Lateiner (it happens co-editor of this volume, but at the 
time my teacher at the University of Pennsylvania) gave me a 
fictional piece he had written (‘a nuga from 1974, in my romantic 
phase’, according to the dedication),which represents a tired but 
still dogged Thucydides in 405, as an exile in Thrace, mulling over 
the course of the war that he knows Athens can no longer win, 
and even more depressed about his ‘unfinished and unfinishable 
work’, which has fallen so far behind current events. The new role 
of Persia as arbiter of the Greeks must have been hard for such a man 
to integrate into his already complex picture. Better to leave the 
challenge to someone younger and more fit for eastern travels, even 
if it must be the one whom Lateiner’s Thucydides calls ‘that idiot 
Xenophon’.
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